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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The interest in determining the causes of the shadow economy and other illegal activities has 
strongly increased in more recent years. However, investigating the causes is still an 
undeveloped area of research. The transformation of the socialist economies was one of the 
main reasons for the interest of governance quality as institutional weaknesses and corruption 
surfaced as major obstacles to market reforms (Abed and Gupta, 2002). However, the 
informal sector plays an important role not only in transition countries, but also in developing 
countries. Employment in the informal sector seems to be a relevant income source for many 
people. An increased interest and new datasets contributed to a rapidly growing empirical 
literature on illegal activities such as shadow economy or corruption (see Schneider and 
Enste, 2000, 2002; Treisman, 2000, and Lambsdorff, 1999 for reviews). Moreover, the 
relevance of investigating not only institutional or governance quality, but also social norms 
or tax morale - the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes - has emerged, as empirical and 
experimental findings indicate that deterrence models predict far too little compliance and far 
too much tax evasion (for an overview, see Alm, 1999; Torgler, 2002). Such findings cannot 
be explained by the degree of risk aversion as some studies report a large gap between the 
effectively reported degree of risk aversion and the amount required to guarantee compliance 
(Graetz and Wilde, 1985, Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1992, Frey and Feld, 2002).  
  Our paper investigates to which extent governance and institutional quality and tax 
morale affect the shadow economy. To check the robustness, we will use three different data 
sources covering more than 25 variables that measure governance and institutional quality. 
Although there are more and more studies that investigate the causes of shadow economic 
activities, there is a tendency to control illegal activities through measures such as 
punishment, prosecution, economic growth or education (Schneider and Enste, 2002). 
However, there are further instruments that merit more attention. It is highly relevant to 16.03.2007    page 3 out of 54 
 
investigate not only the importance of objective variables such as tax burden, the sectoral 
composition, the richness of a country or the labor market conditions, but also institutional 
and governance quality and subjective perceptions, expectations, attitudes and motivations 
such as tax morale which we define as societal institutions. Recently developed data sources 
provide the basis to investigate the importance of more sophisticated theories at the micro and 
the macro level. Hence, our basic working hypothesis suggests that if citizens perceive that 
their interests (preferences) are properly represented in political institutions and consider 
government to be rather helpful than wasteful, their willingness to opt for staying in the 
official sector and comply with their obligations will increase. Moreover, in such a situation 
the violation of social norms when being active in the informal sector is connected with 
higher moral costs. In order to explain international and within country differences and 
changes over time in the size of shadow economies it is useful to investigate to which extent 
social norms and the quality of the governance matter.  
An important contribution of this paper is thus to extend the previous models by 
establishing the extent to which societal institutions matter. In addition, in contrast to the 
limited number of previous studies using cross-sectional data, we provide a panel analysis, 
encompassing a period of 10 years, which allows to exploit the time variation in governance 
quality and to increase the number of observations. Finally, the literature often uses cross-
country data. However, drawing conclusions from cross-cultural comparisons is difficult 
because institutional and cultural frameworks that typify specific countries might influence 
the size of the shadow economy: such features cannot always be controlled in a satisfactory 
manner. Our study, on the other hand, focuses also on within  country data at the state 
(cantonal) level in Switzerland and thus allows to better isolate the impact of societal 
institutions. 
In section 2 we present our theoretical approach and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the data set and section 4 contains the empirical results using the international panel 16.03.2007    page 4 out of 54 
 
and section 5 the within country panel data. Finally, section 6 concludes with a summary and 
discussion of the main results. 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
2.1 Governance and Institutional Quality 
 
Not only the economic, but also the political system affects formal and informal economic 
activities. The outcome in many countries may be explainable by underlying political 
conditions. Bird et al. (2006) stress that “Countries may tend to achieve an equilibrium 
position with respect to the size and nature of their fiscal systems that largely reflects the 
balance of political forces and institutions, and stay at this position until ‘shocked’ to a new 
equilibrium” (p. 289). It is worthwhile to investigate whether the recent political economy 
literature on the importance of governance and institutions allow to understand the level and 
the changes of the shadow economy.  If citizens perceive that their interests (preferences) are 
properly represented in political institutions and they receive an adequate supply of public 
goods, their identification with the state increases, their willingness to contribute increases.  
On the other hand, in an inefficient state where corruption is rampant the citizens will have 
little trust in authority and thus a low incentive to cooperate.  A more encompassing and 
legitimate state increases citizens’ willingness to contribute. If the government and the 
administration have a great discretionary power over the allocation of resources corruption is 
enhanced. A sustainable tax system is based on a fair tax system and responsive government, 
achieved with a strong connection between tax payments and the supply of public goods (Bird 
et al. (2006). Friedman et al. (2000) show empirically that countries with more corruption 
have a higher share of unofficial economy. Dreher and Schneider (2006) have also 16.03.2007    page 5 out of 54 
 
investigated the correlation between shadow economy and corruption. They observe the 
tendency that shadow economy and corruption are substitutes in high-income countries, but 
complements in low-income countries. Agents as the political elite, administration staff, and 
legislators have a discretionary power if institutions are neither credible nor working well. 
This has the negative consequence that citizens lose their trust in the authority. In countries 
where corruption is systemic and the government budget lacks transparency and 
accountability the obligation of paying taxes cannot be assumed to be an accepted social 
norm. Institutional instability, lack of transparency and rule of law undermine the willingness 
of frustrated citizens to be active in the formal economy. Furthermore, there might be a 
crowding-out effect of morality among the tax administrators when there are a great number 
of corrupt colleagues. Moreover, regulatory restraints and bureaucratic procedures not only 
limit competition and the operation of markets, but also provide a better fundament for 
corrupt activities. If individuals and businesses believe that neither contracts will be enforced 
nor productive efforts protected, their incentive to be active in the shadow economy increases. 
Citizens will feel cheated if they believe that corruption is widespread, their tax burden is not 
spent well, their government lacks accountability, and that they are not protected by the rules 
of law. This increases the incentive to enter the informal sector. 
Thus our first core hypothesis reads: 
 
Core hypothesis 1: An increase in governance and institutional quality reduces ceteris 
paribus the size of shadow economies.  
 
In the within country investigation we are going to focus on the impact of direct democracy 
on the size of the shadow economy. If the government is not benevolent, direct voter 
participation has the potential to control politicians’ discretionary power. Not only can voter 
control help limit the abuse of political power by selfish politicians, when citizens cannot 
completely foresee incumbents’ preferences elements of direct democracy also empower them 16.03.2007    page 6 out of 54 
 
with an instrument for controlling the government. Such control has an ex ante effect on 
policy formulation by elected incumbents in that they must always take into account possible 
voter intervention. Levi (1988) points out that a possibility to create or maintain compliance is 
to provide reassurance by the government. A government that precommits itself with direct 
democratic rules imposes itself restraints on its own power and thus sends a signal that 
taxpayers are seen as responsible persons. Furthermore, direct democratic rules signalize that 
citizens are not ignorant or uncomprehending voters, which might create or maintain a certain 
social capital stock. The government signalizes thus that taxpayers’ preferences are taken into 
account in the political process. Voting possibilities also provide utility in themselves. 
Citizens value the right to participate, because it produces a kind of procedural utility as the 
opportunity set increases. It leads to a more favorable outcome compared to the situation 
where no such voting possibility exists. If taxpayers can vote on the way taxes will be spent, 
they may feel less inclined to be active in the shadow economy. The more taxpayers are able 
to participate in the political decision making process by popular rights, the more this contract 
is based on trust, and this trust in turn will foster the moral costs of behaving illegally. If 
participation possibilities are lacking, citizens might feel less satisfied with the system and 
powerless, and thus might be less inclined to comply (Alm, Jackson and McKee, 1993). Rules 
attained through an active involvement of people enhance rule obedience and the willingness 
to cooperate and to act in line with the decided rules. The more people are involved in 
establishing rules, the stronger is their sense of obligation (Kidder and McEwen, 1989; 
Cialdini, 1989; McEwen and Maiman, 1986; Lempert, 1972). Tyler’s research (1990a, 1990b, 
1997) also provides support for the importance of legitimacy and allegiance to authority in 
compliance decisions. The way people are treated by the authorities affects their evaluation of 
these authorities and their willingness to co-operate (see, e.g., Tyler, Casper and Fisher, 
1989). Tyler (1997) argues that understanding what people want in a legal procedure helps to 16.03.2007    page 7 out of 54 
 
explain public dissatisfaction with the law and points towards directions for building public 
support for the law in the future. 
Using Swiss data, Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996) found that in cantons 
with a high degree of direct political control tax evasion is – ceteris paribus – about SFr 1500 
lower than the average in the cantons without such direct influence.  Feld and Frey (2002) 
analyzed how tax authorities treat taxpayers in Switzerland and found that tax authorities of 
cantons with more direct participation rights, compared to cantons with less direct democracy, 
treat taxpayers more respectfully and are less suspicious if taxpayers report too low incomes. 
On the other hand, not submitted tax declarations are more heavily fined. The experimental 
evidence of Alm, McClelland and Schulze (1999), Feld and Tyran (2002) and Torgler and 
Schaltegger (2005) shows that voting on tax issues has a positive effect on tax compliance, 
and according to Torgler (2005a) on tax morale as well. The more taxpayers can participate in 
political decision making by popular rights, the more the tax contract is based on trust and the 
higher is tax morale. Taxpayers are treated as “citizens” with extensive rights and obligations 
(Frey, 2003). They are in the position to better monitor and control politicians via referenda. 
Furthermore, they can set rules via initiative and are thus able to renegotiate the tax contract 
with the government influencing, e.g., the tax laws and the tax rates, which enhances civic 
virtue. Thus, the possibility for citizens to vote on fiscal issues negatively influences the size 
of the shadow economy. Being involved in the political decision process enhances citizens’ 
sense of civic duty (Feld and Frey, 2002). The instrument of direct democracy helps spend 
taxes according to their preferences, the motivation to contribute to the society increases. 
Thus, the following hypothesis can be developed:  
 
Core hypothesis 2: The more extensive the citizens’ direct political participation 
possibilities, the lower ceteris paribus the size of the shadow economy.  
 
2.2 Tax Morale 16.03.2007    page 8 out of 54 
 
 
The tax compliance literature has shown the relevance of going beyond a neoclassical 
approach when trying to understand why citizens pay taxes. Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) 
groundbreaking model which assumes that the extent of tax evasion is negatively correlated 
with the probability of detection and the degree of punishment has been widely criticized 
(e.g., Graetz and Wilde, 1985; Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1992; Frey and Feld, 2002). As 
mentioned, in many countries, the level of deterrence is too low to explain the high degree of 
tax compliance. To resolve this puzzle of tax compliance, many researchers have argued that 
tax morale can help explain the high degree of tax compliance (for an overview see Torgler, 
2007). Tax morale, unlike tax evasion, measures not individual behavior but individual 
attitude. Tax morale—which is not a new notion but has received surprisingly little attention 
in the tax compliance literature—can be defined as a moral obligation to pay taxes, a belief in 
contributing to society by paying taxes.
1 Tax morale is also closely linked to what have been 
termed as taxpayer ethics, “the norms of behaviour governing citizens as taxpayers in their 
relationship with the government” (Song and Yarbrough, 1978, p. 443). Values and attitudes 
can affect individual behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980 and Lewis 1982).  Spicer and 
Lundstedt (1974) argued that the choice between tax compliance and evasion does not result 
only from sanctions but also from a set of attitudes and norms. Lewis (1982) points out that 
 
“it could be that tax evasion is the only channel through which taxpayers can express their 
antipathy … we can be confident in our general prediction that if tax attitudes become worse, 
tax evasion will increase” (p. 165, 177). 
 
                                                 
1 Preliminary tax morale research in the 1960s (Schmölders, 1970; Strümpel, 1969) tried to bridge economics 
and social psychology by emphasizing that economic phenomena should be analyzed from a perspective larger 
than the traditional neoclassical point of view (e.g., Lewis, 1979, 1982). 16.03.2007    page 9 out of 54 
 
A reduction of tax morale reduces the moral costs of behaving illegally and increases the 
incentives to work in the underground economy. It is a relevant issue to investigate whether 
differences in tax morale across countries are reflected in any differences in real, or observed, 
behaviors in these countries.  Thus, we expect that tax morale has such real effects on the size 
of the shadow economy. Moreover, Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Schneider (2004) argue that 
the size of the underground economy can serve as a useful, if somewhat imperfect, measure of 
the extent of tax evasion, so that a negative correlation between the size of the shadow 
economy and tax morale indicates the extent to which individuals’ revealed actions are related 
to their attitudes about paying taxes.   
  Thus, we put forward our third core hypothesis: 
 
Core hypothesis 3:   A higher degree of tax morale, defined as the intrinsic motivation to 
pay taxes, reduces the size of the shadow economy in a country, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
A number of previous studies have investigated the simple correlation between tax morale and 
the size of shadow economy. Alm and Torgler (2006) focus on Europe and the United States. 
They find a strong negative correlation (Pearson r=-0.460) significant at the 0.05 level.   
Analyzing the linear relationship in a simple regression indicates that the variable tax morale 
can explain more than 20 percent of the total variance of the size of shadow economy.  Thus, 
the degree of tax morale has consequences for real behavior, and might be responsible for the 
size of shadow economy: if tax morale is declining, then the shadow economy is likely to 
increase. A similar approach has been used by Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2006) 
focusing on transition countries. The results indicate a strong negative correlation between 
both variables (-0.657), significant at the 0.01 level when working with the World Values 
Survey data 1999-2000.  After including the WVS 1995-1997 and therefore increasing the 16.03.2007    page 10 out of 54 
 
number of observations, the correlation still remains strong and negative (Pearson r = -0.551), 
significant at the 0.01 level.  Thus, here too countries with low tax morale show a clear 
tendency to have a large shadow economy.  A simple linear regression suggests that a 
decrease of tax morale by 1 unit would lead to an increase of the shadow economy of roughly 
20 percentage points, and the variable tax morale can explain more than 30 percent of the total 
variance of the size of shadow economy  Torgler (2005b) investigates the correlation between 
the size of shadow economy and tax morale in Latin America using the Latinobarómetro, an 
annual public opinion survey carried out in 17 Latin American countries (data from 1998), as 
a data set to measure tax morale. It reports the opinions, attitudes, and behaviors of the around 
400 million inhabitants of the region, covering most of Latin America with the exception of 
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico. A strong negative correlation between both 
variables (-0.511), significant at the 0.05 level (sign. 2-tailed: 0.043) has been found. 
However, these studies give information about the raw and not the partial effects.  The 
observed correlation might be explained in terms of factors that affect the size of shadow 
economy. It is important to investigate the causes as a whole with their interdependencies. An 
investigation that focuses on a simple correlation has a somewhat limited validity. Thus, 
multiple regressions help us to disentangle the effects of other factors from a possible tax 
morale effect. 
 
 
3. DATA 
 
3.1 Shadow Economy 
 
The shadow economy includes all market-based legal production of goods and services that 
are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons (Schneider 
2005a):  16.03.2007    page 11 out of 54 
 
(1) to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes, 
(2) to avoid payment of social security contributions, 
(3) to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, 
maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and 
(4) to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing 
statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms. 
 
Hence, in this paper, we will not deal with typical underground economic activities, which are 
all illegal actions with the characteristics of classical crimes like burglary, robbery, drug 
dealing, etc. We also do not include the informal household economy which consists of all 
household services and production. To measure the shadow economy as a percentage of the 
official GDP we will use the DYMIMIC-method to estimate the parameters for determining 
the size of the shadow economy and with the help of the Currency Demand Method to 
calibrate the estimated coefficients of the DYMIMIC procedure into absolute ones. We build 
a panel with values for the years 1990, 1995, and 2000. The fundament of the database has 
been elaborated in previous studies and is therefore not further discussed in this paper (see 
Schneider, 2005a, 2005b).  
 
3.2 Governance and Institutional Quality 
 
Several data sources are used to investigate the relationship between governance or 
institutional quality and the shadow economy.  
 
1) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (see also Knack 1999) 
The ICRG has a special emphasis on aspects affecting private foreign investment decisions.  
The rating comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of risk: political, financial, and 
economic. We will mainly focus on the political risk component. However, in several cases 
we are also going to include the COMPOSITE RISK RATING. The POLITICAL RISK 16.03.2007    page 12 out of 54 
 
RATING is provided to assess the political stability on a comparable basis using 12 different 
measurements that cover both political and social attributes. We will investigate the 
POLITICAL RISK RATING, but also 8 key sub-components that measure governance and 
institutional quality, namely
2:  BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY
3,  CORRUPTION
4, 
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
5, GOVERNMENT STABILITY
6, LAW & ORDER
7, 
INTERNAL CONFLICT
8  and  MILITARY IN POLITICS
9.  A higher number of points 
indicates a lower potential risk and therefore higher scores are in line with a higher 
institutional and governance quality. 
 
                                                 
2 See http://www.icrgonline.com/page.aspx?page=icrgmethods#Background_of_the_ICRG_Rating_System. 
3 Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy: “High points are given to countries where the bureaucracy 
has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government 
services. In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from political pressure 
and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a 
strong bureaucracy receive low points”.  
4 Assessment of corruption within the political system. Lower scores indicate "high government officials are 
likely to demand special payments" and that "illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of 
government" in the form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax 
assessment, police protection, or loans. "  
5 Measures how responsive the government is with  its people.  
6 Assessment of the government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office. 
(subcomponents: government unity, legislative strength and popular support).  
7 The ‘law’ sub-component measures the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the ‘order’ sub-
component is an assessment of popular observance of the law.  
8 Assessment of the political violence in a country and its actual or potential impact on governance (sub-groups: 
civil war/coup threat, terrorism/political violence, civil disorder). 
9 This variable measures military’s involvement in politics. ICRG stresses that  “its involvement in politics, even 
at a peripheral level, is a diminution of democratic accountability”. 16.03.2007    page 13 out of 54 
 
2) Aggregate Governance Indicators  
We use the Quality of Governance Index as a key proxy for governance and institutional 
quality (see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2003). The disadvantage is that no data is 
available for the year 1990. Thus, for these variables only two time periods are available.  The 
variables are based on several hundred variables measuring perceptions of governance and 
derived from 25 different data sources. Kaufmann et al. (2003) classify the six governance 
indicators into three groups as follows: 
 
1)  Process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced  
-  VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: measures the political process, civil 
liberties, and political rights, and 
-  POLITICAL STABILITY AND ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE:   measures 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized/overthrown). 
2)  Capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies 
-  GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS (inputs required for the government to 
be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods), 
and 
-  REGULATORY QUALITY (focuses more on policies, such as incidence of 
market/unfriendly policies, perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive 
regulation). 
3)  Respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions  
-  RULE OF LAW (several indicators measuring the degree of agents’ 
confidence in and compliance with the rules of society). According to 
Kaufmann et al. (2003, p.4) these indicators “measure the success of a 16.03.2007    page 14 out of 54 
 
society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules 
form the basis of economic and social interactions”, and  
-  CONTROL OF CORRUPTION: measures the perceived corruption (exercise 
of public power for private gain).  
 
All scores estimated by Kaufmann et al. (2003) lie between –2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores 
corresponding to better institutions (governance outcomes). We check the robustness of the 
statistical results using all single sub-indexes independently.  
The variables of the data sets ICRG and Aggregate Governance Indicators are highly 
correlated. For example, the correlation between the POLITICAL RISK RATING and the 
average of all six variables in the Aggregate Governance Indicators is 0.88. We will use these 
two sets of variables in alternative estimations to check the robustness of our first two core 
hypotheses.  
 
3) Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) 
The objective of the index is to measure the economic freedom in an accurate and 
comprehensive manner (see Gwarney et al., 2006). The data is derived from third-party 
international sources such as the IMF, World Bank, World Economic Forum etc. The index 
covers a large number of countries over a certain period of time. Some data is available for all 
three time periods others for two or only one period. We investigate many variables that 
measure the legal structure, the security of property rights and the regulation of businesses 
(LEGAL SYSTEM
10, LAW AND ORDER, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
11, IMPARTIAL 
                                                 
10 Integrity of the legal system and property rights (index covering JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, IMPARTIAL 
COURTS and PROPERTY RIGHTS.  
11 The judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by the government or parties in disputes.  16.03.2007    page 15 out of 54 
 
COURTS
12, PROPERTY RIGHTS
13, MILITARY INTERFERENCE
14, ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONDITIONS
15). The variables in the first group measure the integrity of the legal system, 
the protection of intellectual property, judicial independence, impartial courts, and military 
interference in rule of law and the political process. The second one measures regulations that 
restrict businesses’ entry into the market. Stricter regulations increase the incentive to be 
active in the shadow economy. The variables used are designed to identify the extent to which 
regulatory restraints and bureaucratic procedures limit competition and the operation of 
markets (BUREAUCRACY (TIME)
16, STARTING BUSINESS
17, IRREGULAR 
PAYMENTS
18, BUSINESS REGULATIONS
19). Higher values are in line with a higher level 
of freedom.  
 
3.3 Tax Morale 
 
We define tax morale as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. It measures an individual’s 
willingness to pay taxes, in other words, the moral obligation to pay taxes or the belief that 
                                                 
12 A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the legality of government actions or 
regulations.  
13 Protection of intellectual property.  
14 Military interference in rule of law and political process.  
15 Administrative procedures are an important obstacle to starting a new business. 
 
16 Time invested in government bureaucracy – senior management spends a substantial amount of time dealing 
with government bureaucracy.  
17 Starting a new business – starting a new business is generally easy.  
18 Irregular, additional payments connected with import and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, 
tax assessments, police protection, or loan applications.  
19 Composite index measuring including all four indexes including also PRICE controls (extent to which 
businesses are free to set their own prices).  16.03.2007    page 16 out of 54 
 
paying taxes contributes to society. Data for the tax morale variable are extracted from the 
World Values Survey (WVS) 1990-1993, 1995-1997 and 1999-2001 (see Inglehart et al., 
2000). The surveys investigate socio-cultural and political change and collect comparative 
data on values and belief systems. They are based on representative national samples of at 
least 1000 individuals.  The World Values Survey (WVS) is worldwide and covers quite a 
huge number of countries. The general question to assess the level of tax morale is: 
 
(i) World Values Survey/European Values Survey:  
 “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between: (…) Cheating on tax if you have the 
chance (% “never justified” – code 1 from a ten-point scale where 1=never and 10=always).” 
 
 
The tax morale variable is developed by recoding the ten-point scale into a four-point scale (0 
to 3), with the value 3 standing for “never justifiable”.  The value of 0 is an aggregation of the 
last 7 scale points, which were rarely chosen.   
Of course, the measurement of tax morale is not free of bias. First, because the available 
data are based on self-reports in which subjects tend to overstate their degree of compliance 
(Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998), and no objective or observable measure of tax morale 
is available. Nonetheless, because the way we define tax morale is less sensitive than asking 
whether a person has evaded taxes, we expect the degree of honesty to be higher. Moreover, 
the dataset is based on broad surveys; respondents are therefore less liable to react with 
suspicion and/or to be influenced by other questions touching the tax context. It can still be 
argued, however, that a taxpayer who has evaded in the past will tend to excuse this kind of 
behavior and report a higher tax morale in the survey. In general, the use of such a single 
question has the advantage of reducing problems of index construction complexity, especially 
as regards the measurement procedure or low correlation between items. It can also be argued 16.03.2007    page 17 out of 54 
 
though that tax morale is a multidimensional concept requiring a multi-item measurement tool 
and that the reduced likelihood of a multi-item index to be adversely affected by random 
errors will produce more reliable measures. However, several previous studies have found 
consistent results using single-item survey measurements and laboratory experiments (e.g., 
Cummings et al., 2005; Alm and Torgler, 2006). Despite these possible objections our 
approach to measuring tax morale is consistent with the previous studies in this area (for an 
overview see Torgler, 2007).  
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
4.1 Specification of the Test Equation  
 
To test whether improvements in governance/institutional quality and tax morale foster a 
lower level of shadow economy, we propose the following baseline equation:  
 
 
SHADOWit = α + β1 CTRLit +β2 GOVINSTit +β3 TAXMORALEit+  TDt +REGIONi + εit (1) 
 
where i indexes the countries in the sample, SHADOWit denotes countries’ size of the shadow 
economy as a percentage of the official GDP  over the periods 1990, 1995 and 2000. 
GOVINSTit  are our indicators for governance and institutional quality as described in the 
previous section and TAXMit the level of tax morale. The regressions also contain several 
control variables, CTRLi, including factors such as GDP per capita, the share of agriculture in 
GDP, the share of urban population, the size of the population, the labor force, the marginal 
tax rate, price controls and labor market regulations. To control for time as well as regional 16.03.2007    page 18 out of 54 
 
invariant factors, we include fixed time, TDt,  and fixed regional effects, REGIONi
20.  εit  
denotes the error term
21.   
In order to fulfill the ceteris paribus conditions, we have to control for a number of 
other important factors, what will be discussed in turn: 
 
(i) Richness of a Country 
Per capita GDP is a proxy for the level of development of a country. A higher level of 
development goes together with a greater capacity to pay and collect taxes, as well as a higher 
relative demand for income elastic public goods and services (Chelliah, 1971; Bahl, 1971). In 
general, we would expect a negative relation between the level of per capita income and the 
level of the shadow economy. Our fourth hypothesis is:  
 (4) The higher the per capita income of a country is, the lower is the shadow economy, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
(ii) Fiscal Burden 
The fiscal burden is also expected to influence the shadow economy positively. It can be 
argued that a higher burden increases the attractiveness of behaving illegally. As a proxy we 
use the top marginal tax rate (and income threshold at which it applies) provided by the 
Economic Freedom of the World data base. We expect a positive correlation between the 
fiscal burden and the size of shadow economy. However, using the marginal tax rates has 
some limitations. It can be argued that it is not so much the statutory tax rates that are relevant 
in the decision to behave illegally, but rather their application, offering tax exceptions or 
concessions that affect individual decisions (Friedman et al., 2000). The authors couldn’t find 
evidence that higher direct or indirect tax rates are associated with a larger unofficial 
                                                 
20 We differentiate between developed, Asian, and developing or transition countries. 
21 For summary statistics and an overview of the countries see Appendix Table A1 and Table A3.  16.03.2007    page 19 out of 54 
 
economy. On the contrary, they find some evidence that higher direct tax rates are associated 
with a smaller shadow economy. Such results are also supported by Dreher and Schneider 
(2006). In spite of the so far mixed empirical evidence we still formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 (5) The higher the fiscal burden, the higher the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. 
 
 (iii) Demographic and labor characteristics 
Demographic and labor characteristics such as population size or the labor force may also 
affect the shadow economy. As Bahl (2003, p. 13) points out, in countries with faster growing 
populations tax systems may lag behind in the ability to capture new taxpayers. This may 
increase the incentive to be active in the underground economy. Moreover the higher density 
of population in urban areas may further anonymity and thus reduce loyalty towards the state; 
this may lead to a higher level of shadow economy. As many sectors are city-based, it is 
expected that there the incentives to act in the underground economy are higher, especially 
when government activities and services are below individuals’ expectations and preferences. 
Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
  (6) The higher the urbanization and the population size, the higher ceteris paribus the 
shadow economy. 
 
The labor force variable measures the potential pool that has the best preconditions to work in 
the shadow economy. On the other hand, individuals with an occupation have less leisure time 
at their disposal. Thus, time acts as a restriction to being active in the shadow economy. 
Unemployed people have an incentive not to report their additional work hours as otherwise 
they would lose their financial support. If the wage of illicit work and the financial aid 
together yield more income than regular and overtime work, taking also into account the costs 
of detection and punishment and assuming risk neutrality, full-time illicit work as an 16.03.2007    page 20 out of 54 
 
unemployed person yields ceteris paribus a higher utility. In such a situation, the danger that a 
person remains in the shadow economy and turns down job offers increases (Schneider and 
Enste, 2002)
22. In sum, we predict the following hypothesis: 
(7) The higher the labor force, the lower ceteris paribus the shadow economy. 
 
(iv) Sectoral Composition of a Country 
The sectoral composition of the domestic product may also affect the size of shadow 
economy. A traditional measure signaling the difficulty to tax domestic output is the share of 
agriculture in GDP. Moreover, the tax compliance literature shows the tendency that self-
employed people such as farmers are more inclined to evade taxes than other professions (see, 
e.g., Torgler 2007). We formulate the following hypothesis:  
 (8) The higher the agricultural sector is, the higher is the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. 
 
(v) Openness 
We also measure openness focusing on trade. Trade is transparent and easier to tax and 
therefore more difficult to hide in the underground economy. Thus, a higher trade volume in 
relation to countries’ GDP may lead ceteris paribus to a lower shadow economy. Thus, the 
next hypothesis reads:  
(9) The higher the trade is, the higher is ceteris paribus the shadow economy. 
 
(vi) Regulations 
                                                 
22 We have investigated the impact of unemployment without reporting the results in the empirical part. The 
variable has a relatively high amount of missing values. We were not able to find a statistically significant 
correlation between unemployment and the size of the shadow economy. 
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Finally, regulations can also affect the shadow economy, especially labor regulations. 
Stronger restrictions are a strong incentive to choose the exit option, as they reduce the 
freedom of action (Schneider and Enste, 2002). We are going to investigate labor regulations 
(impact of minimum wage, hiring and firing practices
23, share of labor forces whose wages 
are set by centralized collective bargaining, unemployment benefits
24, use of conscripts to 
obtain military personnel). Moreover, we include a variable that measures the extent to which 
businesses are free to set their own prices. In addition, business regulations are investigated 
when dealing with governance and institutional quality. The Economic Freedom of the World 
allows to include these variables. Higher values are connected with lower restraints. Hence, 
our last hypothesis is: 
(10) The more government interventions in the economy take place, the higher is the shadow 
economy, ceteris paribus. 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Empirical Results  
 
In a first step we focus on the impact of governance/institutional quality on the size of the 
shadow economy working with the ICRG data. To maximize the number of observations we 
include in Table 1 only the control variables provided by the World Development Indicator 
(WDI). In Table 2 we add TAX MORALE to the specifications. Table 1 and Table 2 present 
two different types of empirical methodology: pooling and fixed effect regressions. In the 
pooled estimations, the beta  or  standardized  regression coefficients compare magnitude, 
which reveals the relative importance of which variables are used. To obtain robust standard 
errors in these estimations, we use the Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors. 
                                                 
23 Hiring and firing practices of companies are determined by private contract.  
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At first only the POLITICAL RISK RATING index has been included. In a next step, 8 sub-
factors are investigated. This allows to check in detail the robustness of the political factors. 
Table 1 and 2 show that our first hypothesis cannot be rejected. In 17 out of 18 regressions, 
the coefficients are highly statistically significant. The strongest impact can be found for the 
variables BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY, CORRUPTION, and LAW & ORDER. Table 2 also 
shows that hypothesis 3 - a higher tax morale leads to a smaller shadow economy – cannot be 
rejected. The beta coefficients also show that its quantitative impact is comparable to other 
determinants. Thus, tax morale clearly matters, being highly statistically significant in all 18 
estimations.  
Moreover, in line with our expectations Tables 1 and 2 show that a higher GDP per 
capita is associated with a smaller shadow economy which is in line with hypothesis 4. In 
most of the cases the coefficient is statistical significant. The coefficient 
AGRICULTURE/GDP is only statistically significant in the specifications (11), (16) and (18) 
with a positive correlation between the strength of the agriculture sector and the size of the 
shadow economy (partly confirming our hypothesis 8). Population size and labor force affect 
the size of the shadow economy when using the broader sample, but after including tax 
morale these factors are not statistically significant anymore. On the other hand, a positive 
correlation between URBANIZATION and the size of the shadow economy is only 
observable in Table 2 (no support for hypothesis 6 and 7). Similarly, the coefficient of 
TRADE is only statistically significant with an expected negative relationship in the 
specifications (13) and (14).  
Table 3 also investigates ICRG’s COMPOSITE RISK RATING. The coefficient is 
also statistically significant. Moreover, to check the robustness of the previous results we add 
additional factors, namely TOP MARGINAL TAX RATE, PRICE CONTROLS AND 
LABOR MARKET REGULATIONS in the previous specifications. For simplicity, in Table 3 
we only report the results relative to the POLITICAL RISK RATING index rather than all the 16.03.2007    page 23 out of 54 
 
sub-factors. However, it should be noted that the results remain robust when using the 
previous sub-factors. It is useful to include the further control factors sequentially as the 
number of observations decreases. In line with the previous findings we can observe that our 
core hypotheses cannot be rejected. The coefficients POLITICAL RISK RATING and TAX 
MORALE are always statistically significant. We find the tendency that an increase in the 
TOP MARGINAL TAX RATE reduces the size of the shadow economy. In line with 
hypothesis 5, a strong and statistically significant impact is observable in the specifications 
(20) and (21), but not after controlling for tax morale and labor market regulations leading to 
the conclusions that our prediction is only partly confirmed. Previous studies such as 
Friedman et al. (2000) and Dreher and Schneider (2006) were not able to find a robust 
positive correlation between the fiscal burden and the size of the shadow economy. Friedman 
et al. (2000) stress such proxies do not measure how the tax system is administrated. Table 3 
also shows that price controls and labor market regulations are no reasons for firms to move 
into the unofficial economy although it should be noted that for the variable LABOR 
MARKET REGULATIONS many values are missing. To check the robustness, we have also 
investigated the sub-factors (impact of minimum wage, hiring and firing practices, share of 
labor forces whose wages are set by centralized collective bargaining, unemployment benefits, 
use of conscripts to obtain military personnel). In none of the cases the coefficients were 
statistically significant.  
 
 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
 
In Table 4 we provide additional robustness checks using alternative sources that measure 
governance and institutional quality, namely the 6 Aggregate Governance Indicators together 
with the average of all six factors, and 11  Economic Freedom (EFW) variables. The EFW 
data also covers several variables that measure business regulations. For simplicity, we only 16.03.2007    page 24 out of 54 
 
report in Table 4 the coefficients of our core variables, but controlling for other factors in the 
regression. The left hand side in Table 4 presents 18 regression results without including tax 
morale. Control variables are in line with specification (20) that includes also the marginal tax 
rate.  The right hand side provides the results when adding tax morale in the specifications. 
The previous results are confirmed. In all 18 specifications, TAX MORALE is statistically 
significant. Similarly, we can conclude that governance and institutions matter. In most of the 
cases the coefficients are statistically significant. Less robust results are observable when 
investigating some business regulation variables. The strongest effects are observable for the 
two variables ADMINISTRATIVE CONDITIONS and IRREGULAR PAYMENTS. 
Moreover, the overall index BUSINESS REGULATIONS shows also a strong negative 
correlation which shows that a higher level of freedom is correlated with a lower shadow 
economy. GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS, CONTROL OF CORRUPTION, and RULE 
OF LAW provide the strongest impact among the Aggregate Governance Indicators factors.  
The findings using the EFW variables also show the strength of the legal structure and the 
security of property rights.  
In a next step we provide further robustness test. Previously, we have 1) included 
additional variables in the baseline equation, 2) presented estimations with a broad amount of 
sub-factors that measure governance and institutional quality, and 3) used three alternative 
data sources. In a further step, we are going to investigate in all the previous cases whether 
outliers are important. We run specifications that resist the pull of outliers, and make them 
more efficient using iteratively re-weighted least squares with Huber and bi-weight functions 
tuned for 95% Gaussian efficiency (Hamilton, 2004). As a consequence more extreme outliers 
are less heavily weighted in the regression calculations. The results are not reported, but they 
strongly support the previous findings. The coefficient TAX MORALE is always statistically 
significant showing even higher t-values (mostly statistically significant at the 1% level), as 
are in most of the cases the variables that measure governance or institutional quality.  16.03.2007    page 25 out of 54 
 
 
4.4 Causality 
 
The causality direction of our two main hypotheses can be criticized. Do a higher tax morale 
or a better governance and better institutions cause a lower level of shadow economy, or do 
higher levels of underground activities undermine tax morale or governance and institutional 
quality? A substantial increase of the shadow economy can lead to a significant decrease in 
tax revenues and therefore to a lower quantity and quality of public goods and services. The 
more taxpayers believe that others work in the shadow economy, the lower their moral costs 
to behave dishonestly and evade taxes by transferring their own activities into the shadow 
economy. In this way the potential intrinsic motivation to comply and contribute to public 
sector activities gets crowded out. Evaluating the direct effect of tax morale or governance 
and institutional quality on the size of the shadow economy requires an investigation of any 
potential causality problems and therefore an instrumental variable technique. To check the 
robustness we are going to present 2SLS estimations with a variety of different instruments. 
In general, the choice of adequate instruments for institutions is not extensively addressed in 
the literature (for corruption see, e.g., Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatόn, 1999; Bai and 
Wei, 2000; Kaufmann, Mehrez and Gurgur, 2002). Recent studies have also stress the 
relevance of considering historical and geographic features of the countries as instrumental 
variables as they influence the outcome through their impact on the institutional and political 
environment
 25. Studies such as those by Alesina et al. (2003) or La Porta et al. (1999) offer a 
broad data set to consider factors such as latitude, fractionalization (ethnic, language, and 
religion), religious affiliations or legal origin as instruments. Easterly and Levine (1997) find 
a negative correlation between per capita GDP growth and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
Alesina et al. (2003) provide support for theses results using a broader data set for 
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fractionalization. Thus, in line with this literature we are going to consider linguistic 
FRACTIONALIZATION as an instrument for governance and institutional quality. As a 
further instrument we take religion. La Porta et al. (1999), Weber (1958), Putnam (1993) and 
Landes (1998) argue that religion can affect governance and government’s performance. La 
Porta et al. (1997) find that “hierarchical religions” (p. 233) such as Catholicism, Islam, and 
Greek Orthodox – exhibit inferior government performance to that of largely Protestant 
countries. Referring to the cultural theories the authors argue that Muslim and Catholic 
countries provide inferior public goods and that these countries can be viewed as more 
interventionist and less efficient as a consequence of excessive power and the development of 
bureaucracies from religious ranks. Thus, following La Porta et al. (1999) we use the SHARE 
OF PROTESTANTS as an instrument for governance and institutional quality.  
There is an increasing number of studies that stress that climatic conditions have an 
impact on countries’ or regions’ institutions and their development and individuals’ attitudes 
and their behavior (see, e.g., Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Landes, 1998; La Porta et al. 
1999; Diamond, 1999; Sachs, 2000; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Coyle, 2004). Such 
external situations may affect the character of inhabitants and hence their culture and 
institutional arrangements. According to Diamond (1999) geography and climate helps to 
explain different nations’ economic destinies. Porta et al. (1999) investigate latitude arguing 
in line with Landes (1998) that temperature zones have more productive agriculture and 
healthier climate which helped to develop their economies and institutions. Hall and Jones 
(1999) argue that latitude is a proxy for the penetration of European institutions in various 
regions of the world. Thus, we will also consider LATITUDE as an instrument of governance 
and institutional quality. However, Sachs (2000) criticizes that “when latitude is tested for 
explanatory power against various direct climate or ecological measures, we find that latitude 
per se adds little if anything to the explanation of patterns of cross-country development” (pp. 
4-5). The studies of Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Landes (1998) and Sachs (2000) 16.03.2007    page 27 out of 54 
 
investigate the connection between climate and economic development. Sachs (2000), for 
example, presents evidence that production technology in the tropics has lagged behind 
temperate zone technology in the areas of agriculture and health which opened a considerable 
income gap between climate zones. Roll (1992) stresses that the unambiguously observable 
weather is a genuinely exogenous identifying variable. Schaltegger and Torgler (2007), for 
example, have shown that weather conditions are valid instruments for government 
accountability. Temperature has also the advantage that we observe a certain variety over time 
and can therefore be considered in a panel analysis. Coyle (2004) stresses that a higher 
temperature is related to a lower performance and productivity. Still many countries, even in 
Europe for example, don’t have air-conditioning. Thus, we are going to investigate in detail 
the relevance of nation’s yearly mean TEMPERATURE in Celsius
26 as an instrument for 
governance and institutional quality.  
Weather may also be relevant as instrument for tax morale. The psychology literature 
has found that sunshine is connected with a better feeling and a lack of sunshine is related to 
depression and suicide (see, e.g., Eagles, 1994 and Tietjan and Kripke, 1994). Several studies 
report that sunshine influences markets. Cloudiness is correlated with a negative stock 
exchange (Saunders 1993 and Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003). Thus, CLOUDINESS (cloud 
coverage in percentage)
27 may be a good instrument for tax morale. To check the robustness 
of our results we are going to explore a second instrument. We develop an index that 
measures moral values using data from the World Values Survey
28 (INDEX MORAL 
VALUES).  In addition, we also use the SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS as a second 
instrument of governance and institutional quality. It measures general public satisfaction or 
                                                 
26 See Mitchell et al. (2003). 
27 See Mitchell et al. (2003). 
28 We use the following questions to develop an index for moral values (mean values): justifiability of claiming 
government benefits to which you are not entitled,  justifiability of avoiding a fare on public transport, and 
buying something you knew was stolen (1=never justifiable, 0=all other scales).  
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dissatisfaction covering also a broad spectrum of factors ranging from infant mortality and 
medical provision to housing and interest rates. The data is provided by the EFW.  
Table 5 and 6 show 25 2SLS estimations with several diagnostic tests. In all the 
specifications the coefficients of GOVERNANCE/INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY and TAX 
MORALE are statistically significant, which supports our previous results. For simplicity we 
only focus on a selection of variables, namely the POLITICAL RISK RATING, the ICRG 
CORRUPTION, and two variables of the Aggregate Governance Indicators, namely INDEX 
GOVERNANCE (average value of all sub-factors) and CONTROL OF CORRUPTION. 
However, it should be noted that the results are also robustness when using other factors.  
Table 5 presents 2SLS estimations without considering TAX MORALE. To check the 
robustness we will present pooled and FE regressions. In a first step we are going to consider 
the instruments TEMPERATURE and SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS (specifications 63 
to 72). Instead of TEMPERATURE we are going to include LATITUDE as instrument in 
specification (73). Specification (74) adds in addition further instruments, namely 
LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION and SHARE OF PROTESTANTS. Due to the lack 
of variance over time we use only pooled 2SLS estimations. For simplicity we only use the 
POLITICAL RISK RATING as a proxy for governance/institutional quality. However, the 
results are also robust when using other factors.  
In Table 6 we include TAX MORALE in the specifications. In a first step we use 
CLOUDINESS as an instrument of TAX MORALE (see specifications 75 to 79, and 85 to 
86). In a second step we take the INDEX MORAL VALUES as an instrument (specifications 
83 AND 87). Also here we vary the instruments for governance/institutional quality. In a first 
step we use TEMPERATURE AND SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS, in a second step we 
investigate LATITUDE instead of TEMPERATURE and in a final step we consider also 
LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION and SHARE OF PROTESTANTS. In specification 
(63) and (66) we only use TEMPERATURE as an instrument for governance and institutional 16.03.2007    page 29 out of 54 
 
quality. In a further step, the SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS is added as an instrument. 
The results show that in all the cases the coefficients of TAX MORALE and the quality of 
governance and institutions are statistically significant, which supports the previous findings. 
In specifications (84) to (87) we present only 2SLS estimations with the POLITICAL RISK 
RATING as a proxy for governance/institutional quality. However, also here the results are 
robust when using other proxies for institutional and governance quality.  
Overall, the used instruments are effective in explaining tax morale and 
governance/institutional quality. In the governance/quality first stage regressions 
TEMPERATURE, LATITUDE, SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS, and LINGUISTIC 
FRACTIONALIZATION and SHARE OF PROTESTANTS are always statistically 
significant (except SHARE OF PROTESTANTS in Table 6). Similarly, CLOUDINESS and 
the INDEX OF MORAL VALUES are always statistically significant in the tax morale first 
stage regression. The F-tests for the instrument exclusion set in the first-stage regressions are 
also in all the cases statistically significant (mostly at the 1% level). In addition, Table 5 and 6 
also report a test for instrument relevance using the Anderson canonical correlations LR for 
whether the equation is identified. The test shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected in 
all the cases indicating that the model is identified and the instruments are relevant (see Hall, 
Rudebusch and Wilcox, 1996). The Anderson-Rubin test suggests that the endogenous 
variables are jointly statistically significant. Such a test is robust to the presence of weak 
instruments. We also present the Sargan’s (1958) test for over-identification for those 2SLS 
regressions in which we have more than two instruments to examine the validity of the 
exclusion restrictions. In most of the cases, this test fails to reject the null hypothesis that our 
instruments are valid, which supports their validity.  
  In sum, the empirical results provided in this section suggest that our key hypotheses 
cannot be rejected. Tax morale and governance and institutional quality play a significant role 
in the determination of the size of the shadow economy. Moreover, sub-factors also indicate 16.03.2007    page 30 out of 54 
 
the importance of the political process, political or democratic rights and civil liberties which 
indicates that our second hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, in the next section the 
second hypothesis will be tested using within country data.  
 
 
 
 
5. WITHIN COUNTRY PANEL EVIDENCE 
 
 
 
In general, drawing conclusions from cross-cultural comparisons is difficult because not all 
features specific to a country can always be controlled in a satisfactory manner. Thus, we 
extend our study, focusing on within country data from Switzerland at the state (cantonal) 
level to investigate the impact of tax morale and institutional quality. Analyses of Swiss data 
are interesting because Switzerland’s institutions are not homogeneous. The degree of 
institutionalized political participation rights varies strongly between the 26 Swiss cantons 
(see Kobach, 1994). Thus, this study uses a 6-point scale index established by Frey and 
Stutzer (2000) that reflects the extent of direct democratic participation (1 = lowest and 6 = 
highest degree of participation).
29 In line with the previous regressions, we are going to 
investigate a sample period that covers the years 1990, 1995 and 2000. To control for cantonal 
invariant factors, we include cantonal fixed effects. The tax morale variable is derived from 
the World Values Survey (WVS) data 1995-1997 and the  International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP) data set “Religion II” (data year 1999). The question in the ISSP (year 
1999) was: Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does not report all of his or her 
income in order to pay less income taxes? (1= not wrong, 2= a bit wrong, 3= wrong,   
                                                 
29 The index includes four legal instruments: the popular initiative to change the canton’s constitution, the 
popular initiative to change the canton’s law, the compulsory and optional referendum to prevent a new law or 
change a law, and the compulsory or optional referendum to prevent new state expenditure (for a detailed 
discussion, see Stutzer, 1999).  16.03.2007    page 31 out of 54 
 
4=seriously wrong). The similarity of this question with the one of the WVS allows to include 
both data sets in the specification
30.  
Using Swiss data allows to include also a deterrence measurement. As an 
approximation for the PROBABILITY OF DETECTION, we use the number of tax auditors 
per taxpayer (in ‰) in each canton c. This might be an indicator for the cantons willingness to 
search for illegal activities, although we are not able to directly investigate the number of 
inspectors dealing with the shadow economy
31.  In addition to other control variables such as 
LABOR FORCE ratio (share of employment of the cantonal population) URBANIZATION, 
or the TAX BURDEN we also consider the share of REGISTERED CANTONAL HOUSE 
PROPRIETORS on the cantonal population
32. The commitment made by house proprietors to 
their jurisdiction by voluntarily increasing their opportunity costs for the exit option to 
migrate to another jurisdiction may support the willingness to remain honest. On the other 
hand, house proprietors have a strong demand for those economic sectors that have the 
highest rates of illicit work. Schneider and Enste (2002) report that building, renovating, 
repairing provide the largest share of illicit work (44% of the total illicit work) in Germany. 
Such results are also applicable to Switzerland. Thus, home proprietors may have a stronger 
incentive to take advantage of such services which increases the shadow economy.  
                                                 
30 It was not possible to consider more than one wave for both data sets for Switzerland.  Only the WVS 1995-97 
and the ISSP RELIGION II provide Swiss cantonal data. Moreover, it should be noted that the Swiss World 
Values Survey was not random-random but quota-random, based on a random sample of communes and then on 
quotas in terms of sex, age, etc. in the selected communes. Thus, the smallest cantons are not necessarily 
represented (not represented are: Appenzell a. Rh., Glarus, Jura, Nidwalden, Uri, and Zug). On the other hand, 
the ISSP data set contains all 26 cantons.  
31 The information about the probability of detection and the fine for tax evasion has been collected by Lars P. 
Feld and Bruno S. Frey with a questionnaire. The following contributions are based upon this data set: Feld and 
Frey (2002) and Frey and Feld (2002).  
32 For summary statistics see Table A2 in the Appendix.  16.03.2007    page 32 out of 54 
 
Table 7 presents the results. The first two specifications include TAX MORALE. 
These results should be treated with caution as only few degrees of freedom are available, and 
as tax morale has been measured with two different data sources. Nevertheless, in line with 
the previous results we find a negative correlation between tax morale and the size of the 
shadow economy. A higher level of direct democratic participation rights leads to a lower size 
shadow economy as well. The coefficient is statistically significant in all 9 regressions. In 
specification (80) and (83) we present 2SLS estimations. As can be seen the coefficient 
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION RIGHTS is statistically significant at the 1% level. In line 
with the cross-country regression we use religion as an instrument for direct democracy 
building the share of Protestant population on the total cantonal population. A certain religion 
diversity in Switzerland allows such an approach. Table 7 shows that the instrument is 
effective in explaining political accountability. The coefficient SHARE OF PROTESTANTS 
is highly statistically significant in both first stage regressions. Similarly, the F-tests for the 
instrument exclusion set the first-stage regressions are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
In addition, Table 7 also reports a test for instrument relevance using the Anderson canonical 
correlations LR for whether the equation is identified. The test shows that the null hypothesis 
can be rejected in both cases indicating that the model is identified and the instruments are 
relevant.  
In Table 7 we also report a pooled estimation that shows the beta or standardized 
regression coefficients compare magnitude, which reveals the relative importance of which 
variables are used. To obtain robust standard errors in these estimations, we use the 
Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors. The results in specification (82) show 
that the coefficients of DIRECT DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION RIGHTS are highly 
relevant in explaining the shadow economy.  
Looking at the control variables we find in line with Friedman et al. (2000) evidence 
of the tendency that the tax burden is negatively correlated with the shadow economy. 16.03.2007    page 33 out of 54 
 
Interestingly, we also find that a higher probability of detection is correlated with a higher 
rather than a lower size of shadow economy, although the result is not robust in specification 
(83). It should be noted that other studies that focused on tax evasion, tax compliance and tax 
morale in Switzerland also find that deterrence does not perform as expected (see 
Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann 1996, Frey and Feld, 2002; Torgler, 2005a, Torgler and 
Schaltegger, 2005). A higher SHARE OF REGISTERED HOUSE PROPRIETORS is 
correlated with a higher shadow economy. The coefficient is statistically significant in all five 
regressions. We also observe the tendency that URBANIZATION is correlated with a higher 
shadow economy, a result that supports our prediction in the theoretical section. On the other 
hand, a higher share of employment of the cantonal population (LABOR FORCE) is 
correlated with a smaller shadow economy. It seems that time acts as a restriction of being 
active in the shadow economy. Thus, these results are consistent with hypothesis 6 and 7.  
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The paper shows that improving governance and institutional quality and tax morale helps 
lessen a possible incentive to go underground. The results are quite robust using more than 25 
proxies of governance and institutional quality, testing for endogeneity and running a broad 
variety of specifications. The paper has extended the previous empirical models of the shadow 
economy by showing that tax morale and a broad variety of governance/institutional factors 
matter quite significantly in the determination of the size of the shadow economy providing 
strong robustness tests using international and within country panel data
33. Moreover, we go 
beyond previous studies that mainly use a cross-sectional analysis working not only with an 
international data panel, but also with within country data.  
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It is important to consider the moral dimension of complying with societies’ rules and 
the underlying legal structure and countries’ security of property rights. A failure of a 
country’s legal system undermines the official economy driving individuals and businesses to 
the shadow economy. Also regulatory restraints and bureaucratic procedures limit the 
operation of markets and enhance the incentives to act in the shadow economy. A more 
legitimate and responsive state appears to be an essential precondition to influence the shadow 
economy. If individual and business contracts are not enforced and productive efforts not 
protected, the incentive to be active in the shadow economy increases. Citizens feel cheated if 
corruption is widespread, their tax burden is not spent well, and that they are not protected by 
the rules of law. Such a situation increases the incentive to be in the shadow economy.  
Social norms or social capital are key factors to understand why people comply. 
Moreover, social capital seems to be an important determinant of economic phenomena like 
macroeconomic performance. For example, Knack and Keefer (1997) find, in a cross-
sectional analysis, a strong and significantly positive relationship between social capital 
variables (civic duty) and economic growth. Schaltegger and Torgler (2007), using data for a 
synthetic panel of Swiss cantons over the 1981–2001 period, show that accountability 
enhances fiscal performance. As Slemrod (1998) argues that social capital – measured as the 
willingness to pay taxes voluntarily – lowers the cost of government operations and of 
equitably assigning such cost to citizens.  
Such research justifies a closer look at social capital and societal institutions. A high 
level of governance and institutional quality allows to express one’s own preferences and 
involvement and participation in the political process enhances identification with a state’s 
institutions; this counteracts the inclination to be active in the shadow economy. Participation 
and identification reduce therefore free-rider problems. If citizens and authorities interact with 
a sense of collective responsibility thanks to the institutional structures, the system may be 
better governed and the policies more effective, as accountability promotes effectiveness 16.03.2007    page 35 out of 54 
 
through its impact on government behavior (Schaltegger and Torgler, 2007). On the other 
hand, if citizens feel cheated, if they believe that corruption is widespread, that their tax 
burden is not spent well and that they are not well protected by the rules of law, the incentive 
for them to get involved in the informal sector grows. The institutional architecture and 
governance quality seem to be a key component in the understanding of the shadow economy.  
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Table 1: Governance and Institutional Quality and the Size of Shadow  Economy 
OLS  FE FE  FE FE  FE  FE FE FE  Dependent Variable: Shadow Economy 
(1)
a  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
A) GOVERN.  &  INSTIT.QUALITY             
POLITICAL RISK RATING  -0.386*** -0.380***             
  (-5.16) (-5.15)            
BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY      -3.699***          
     (-4.92)          
CORRUPTION       -3.018***         
      (-4.82)         
DEMOCRATIC  ACCOUNTABILITY        -0.622       
        (-1.17)      
GOVERNMENT STABILITY           -0.894**     
           (-1.99)     
LAW & ORDER             -3.346***    
            (-5.95)    
INTERNAL CONFLICT                -1.525***   
               (-5.25)   
MILITARY INTERFERENCE                -1.620*** 
                (-3.40) 
B) CONTROL VARIABLES               
LOG (GDP PER CAPITA)  -0.503***  -4.113***  -4.550***  -5.032***  -5.649*** -5.469*** -4.343***  -4.707***  -4.938*** 
  (-3.54) (-3.69)  (-4.13) (-4.63)  (-5.03) (-4.87) (-4.02)  (-4.33)  (-4.40) 
AGRICULTURE (% OF GDP)  -0.232**  -0.235**  -0.275***  -0.196** -0.217**  -0.194* -0.171* -0.181* -0.214** 
  (-2.42) (-2.48)  -(2.86) (-2.07)  (-2.15) (-1.97) (-1.84)  (-1.92)  (-2.20) 
URBANIZATION  0.006  0.004 -0.009  0.029 0.029  0.029  0.022 0.039 0.021 
  (0.06)  (0.07) (-0.18)  (0.58) (0.57)  (0.58)  (0.45) (0.80) (0.42) 
LOG  (POPULATION)  -1.376*** -13.695*** -9.090**  -12.255*** -8.399**  -7.061*  -12.774*** -11.625*** -10.950*** 
  (-3.21) (-3.47)  (-2.39) (-3.13)  (-2.11) (-1.78) (-3.35)  (-3.03)  (-2.75) 
LOG  (LABOR  FORCE)  1.232*** 12.081*** 8.340**  10.507*** 7.067*  5.908  11.512*** 10.203**  9.400** 
  (2.81) (3.08)  (2.19) (2.71)  (1.78) (1.50) (3.02)  (2.67)  (2.37) 
TRADE (% GDP)  -0.021  -0.007  0.001  -0.011  -0.012 -0.007 0.0004  0.001  -0.002 
  (-0.33) (-0.39)  (0.06)  (-0.64)  (-0.62) (-0.37) (0.02)  (0.06)  (-0.12) 
Regional Fixed Effects  YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES  YES YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects  YES  YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
Observations  274 274  274 274  274 274 274  274  274 
R-squared  0.554 0.530  0.526 0.524  0.485 0.490 0.544  0.531  0.504 
Prob  >  F  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
a Regressions with robust standard errors, beta 
coefficients reported.   
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Table 2: Tax Morale and the Size of Shadow Economy 
OLS  FE  FE  FE FE FE FE FE FE  Dependent Variable: Shadow Economy 
(10)
a  (11)  (12)  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
A) GOVERN.  &  INSTIT. QUALITY            
POLITICAL RISK RATING  -0.366*** -0.369***          
 (-3.18)  (-3.42)          
BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY      -3.293***        
     (-3.31)        
CORRUPTION        -2.102**       
       (-2.45)       
DEMOCRATIC  ACCOUNTABILITY        -2.046***      
        (-3.47)      
GOVERNMENT STABILITY          -0.201     
         (-0.33)     
LAW & ORDER           -1.844**    
          (-2.42)    
INTERNAL CONFLICT            -1.000*   
           (-1.93)   
MILITARY INTERFERENCE            -1.209* 
            (-1.92) 
B) WILLINGNESS TO PAY             
TAX MORALE  -0.176***  -5.984***  -5.242**  -5.627** -6.121***  -5.582** -5.063** -4.899** -6.852*** 
  (-2.73) (-2.67)  (-2.33)  (-2.45) (-2.73) (-2.35) (-2.19) (-2.09) (-2.83) 
C) CONTROL VARIABLES             
LOG (GDP PER CAPITA)  -0.256  -2.309  -3.848***  -4.957*** -4.578*** -5.462*** -4.361**  -3.961**  -4.514** 
 (-1.15)  (-1.25)  (-2.30)  (-3.01)  (-2.85) (-3.23) (-2.56) (-2.16) (-2.61) 
AGRICULTURE (% OF GDP)  0.270  0.393**  0.251  0.251 0.303 0.317 0.394**  0.406**  0.323* 
 (1.51)  (2.07)  (1.32)  (1.28)  (1.61) (1.59) (2.01) (2.02) (1.65) 
URBANIZATION 0.171*  0.125*  0.103  0.151** 0.151** 0.177** 0.181***  0.162** 0.144** 
 (1.88)  (1.91)  (1.52)  (2.28)  (2.36) (2.62) (2.77) (2.43) (2.11) 
LOG (POPULATION)  0.235  2.101  7.981  2.612 5.452 7.896 2.970 4.136 5.110 
 (0.35)  (0.35)  (1.38)  (0.42)  (0.94) (1.28) (0.48) (0.66) (0.83) 
LOG (LABOR FORCE)  -0.416  -3.732  -9.093  -4.680 -7.490 -9.636 -4.679 -5.857 -6.838 
 (-0.62)  (-0.62)  (-1.56)  (-0.74)  (-1.28) (-1.56) (-0.74) (-0.93) (-1.10) 
TRADE (% GDP)  -0.092  -0.036  -0.032  -0.051*  -0.053*  -0.050 -0.036 -0.029 -0.047 
  (-1.22) (-1.22)  (-1.07)  (-1.71) (-1.83) (-1.63) (-1.17) (-0.89) (-1.56) 
Regional Fixed Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations  109 109  109  109 109 109 109 109 109 
R-squared 0.769  0.725  0.724  0.710 0.726 0.692 0.710 0.703 0.703 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
a Regressions with robust standard errors, beta 
coefficients reported.    
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Table 3: Robustness Check Including Further Variables 
FE FE  FE  FE FE FE FE FE  Dependent Variable: Shadow Economy 
(19) (20)  (21)  (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
A) GOVERN.  & INSTIT.QUALITY           
POLITICAL RISK RATING    -0.343*** -0.338*** -0.337***  -0.334*** -0.465*** -0.407*** -0.509*** 
    (-4.07)  (-3.82)  (-2.94) (-3.22) (-4.15) (-3.56) (-4.22) 
COMPOSITE RISK RATING -0.340***           
 (-4.00)           
B) WILLINGNESS TO PAY            
TAX MORALE        -5.935*** -7.759*** -6.238*** -8.767*** 
         (-2.63) (-3.29) (-2.64) (-3.50) 
C) CONTROL VARIABLES            
LOG (GDP PER CAPITA)  -3.997***  -4.165***  -4.222***  -2.750 -3.554**  -0.551 -1.293 -1.371 
  (-3.41) (-3.11)  (-3.04)  (-1.25) (-2.08) (-0.29) (-0.68) (-0.57) 
AGRICULTURE (% OF GDP)  -0.252**  -0.150  -0.171  0.173  0.266  0.648***  0.612***  0.338 
  (-2.59)  (-1.24)  (-1.39)  (0.57) (1.40) (3.16) (2.94) (1.02) 
URBANIZATION -0.014  -0.007  -0.010  -0.038  0.106  0.111*  0.139**  0.073 
  (-0.28)  (-0.12)  (-0.16)  (-0.55)  (1.56) (1.69) (2.07) (1.07) 
LOG (POPULATION)  -10.661***  -7.359  -8.095  -7.650 5.032  -2.887 -4.900 0.140 
  (-2.72) (-1.49)  (-1.60)  (-1.15) (0.86)  (-0.47) (-0.79) (0.02) 
LOG (LABOR FORCE)  9.401**  5.395  6.399  5.553  -6.608  0.762  2.801  -2.408 
  (2.41) (1.10)  (1.27)  (0.83) (-1.12)  (0.12) (0.45) (-0.36) 
TRADE (% GDP)  -0.001  -0.013  -0.011  -0.016 -0.043 -0.046 -0.044 -0.056* 
  (-0.07) (-0.70)  (-0.57)  (-0.72) (-1.47) (-1.55) (-1.53) (-1.81) 
TOP MARGINAL TAX RATE  0.673***  0.677**  0.530    0.093 0.019 -0.051 
   (2.62)  (2.48)  (1.34)    (0.27) (0.06) (-0.13) 
PRICE CONTROLS      -0.091        -0.412   
     (-0.27)        (-1.10)   
LABOR MARKET REGULATIONS      -0.639      0.448 
       (-0.96)     (0.69) 
Regional Fixed Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Time  Fixed  Effects  YES YES  YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations  274 222  213  148 109 102 97  92 
R-squared  0.512 0.585  0.592  0.571 0.722 0.749 0.779 0.717 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.    
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Table 4: Robustness Check Including Further Governance and  Institutional  Variables 
FE SPECIFICATIONS   Coeff.  Observ.  FE SPECIFICATIONS Coeff.  FE  SPECIFICATIONS  Coeff.  Observ. 
(27) TO (44) 
a t-stat.  R
2  (45) TO (62)
b  t-stat.   (45) to (62)
 b t-stat.  R
2 
AGGR. GOVERNANCE INDIC.      AGGR. GOVERNANCE INDIC.        
INDEX GOVERNANCE   -9.417***  152  INDEX GOVERNANCE   -10.783***  TAX MORALE  -6.860**  76 
  (-4.26) 0.603    (-4.86)   (-2.64)  0.798 
CONTROL OF CORRUP.  -7.361***  152  CONTROL OF CORRUP.  -5.994***  TAX MORALE  -5.159*  76 
 (-4.56)  0.609   (-3.34)    (-1.84)  0.765 
POLITICAL STABILITY  -5.971***  152  POLITICAL STABILITY -7.916***  TAX  MORALE  -8.414***  76 
 (-4.22)  0.602   (-4.50)    (-3.11)  0.790 
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIV.  -9.503***  152  GOVERNMENT EFFECTIV.  -9.028***  TAX MORALE  -5.698**  76 
 (-5.35)  0.627   (-4.60)    (-2.17)  0.792 
VOICE AND ACCOUNT.  -0.824  152  VOICE AND ACCOUNT. -5.505***  TAX  MORALE  -8.299***  76 
 (-0.46)  0.552   (-2.76)    (-2.76)  0.753 
RULE OF LAW  -7.291***  152  RULE OF LAW  -8.497***  TAX MORALE  -5.270*  76 
 (-3.88)  0.595   (-4.11)    (-1.95)  0.781 
REGULATORY QUALITY  -1.819  152  REGULATORY QUALITY  -6.451***  TAX MORALE  -5.639**  76 
 (-0.94)  0.554   (-3.36)    (-2.02)  0.765 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM      ECONOMIC FREEDOM        
LEGAL SYSTEM   -3.011***  224  LEGAL SYSTEM   -3.168***  TAX MORALE  -6.385***  104 
  (-5.06) 0.600    (-4.15)   (-2.78)  0.740 
LAW AND ORDER  -0.971**  153  LAW AND ORDER -0.904*  TAX  MORALE  -5.961*  73 
  (-2.21) 0.568    (-1.70)   (-1.93)  0.743 
JUD. INDEPENDENCE   -2.398***  102  JUD. INDEPENDENCE   -2.206***  TAX MORALE  -9.839***  60 
 (-3.85)  0.577   (-2.99)    (-2.85)  0.738 
IMPARTIAL COURTS   -1.882***  156  IMPARTIAL COURTS   -1.670**  TAX MORALE  -6.158**  76 
 (-2.93)  0.578   (-2.30)    (-2.11)  0.745 
PROPERTY RIGHTS   -3.326***  116  PROPERTY RIGHTS   -2.143**  TAX MORALE  -7.080**  66 
 (-3.87)  0.582   (-2.07)    (-2.11)  0.713 
MILIT. INTERFERENCE   -1.526***  156  MILIT. INTERFERENCE -1.310*  TAX  MORALE  -6.665**  76 
 (-3.14)  0.581   (-1.91)    (-2.23)  0.738 
ADMINISTR. CONDITIONS
c  -6.169*** 65  ADMINISTR.  CONDITIONS
c -7.330***  TAX  MORALE  -7.644**  0.794 
 (-2.98)  0.653    (-3.79)    (-2.09) 43 
BUREAUCRACY (TIME)  -1.416*  110  BUREAUCRACY (TIME)  -0.777  TAX MORALE  -7.338**  66 
 (-1.66)  0.571   -0.77    (-2.09)  0.694 
STARTING BUSINESS  -1.329*  110  STARTING BUSINESS -1.172  TAX  MORALE  -6.381*  66 
 (-1.86)  0.574   -1.50    (-1.86)  0.703 
IRREGULAR PAYMENTS  -1.932***  110  IRREGULAR PAYMENTS -1.981** TAX  MORALE -7.512**  66 
 (-2.70)  0.590   (-2.52)    (-2.27)  0.723 
BUSINESS REGULATIONS  -2.457**  110  BUSINESS REGULATIONS -2.801**  TAX  MORALE  -7.478**  66 
   (-2.52)  0.586     (-2.60)     (-2.27)  0.725 
Notes: Time and regional fixed effects. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
a  Control variables in line with specification (20).     
b Control variables in line with specification (24).  
C Cross-sectional analysis.    
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Table 5: 2SLS Estimations Focusing on Governance/Institutional  Quality 
POOLED POOLED FE  FE  POOLED FE  POOLED FE  POOLED FE  POOLED POOLED   Dependent Variable: Shadow 
Economy   (63)    (64)    (65)    (66)    (67)    (68)    (69)    (70)    (71)    (72)    (73)    (74) 
A) GOVERN./INSTIT. 
QUALITY 
                 
ICRG                    
POLITICAL RISK  RATING  -0.782**  -0.640***  -1.358**  -0.481***              -0.590*** -0.529*** 
 (-2.02)  (-3.43)  (-2.23)  (-3.13)              (-3.08) (-3.06) 
CORRUPTION        -8.971*** -9.540***            
        (-3.34) (-3.13)           
AGGR. GOVERNANCE 
INDIC. 
                 
INDEX GOVERNANCE            -19.830*** -16.842***         
           (-3.40)  (-3.08)         
CONTR. OF CORRUPTION                -14.848*** -12.245***     
               (-3.45)  (-3.19)     
B) CONTROL VARIABLES  INCL. INCL. INCL. INCL.  INCL. INCL.  INCL. INCL.  INCL. INCL.  INCL. INCL. 
FIRST  STAGE  REGRESSIONS                    
INSTR.  INST./GOV. Q.                       
TEMPERATURE -0.336***  -0.394***  -0.240**  -0.295***  -0.037*** -0.037***  -0.013*** -0.013***  -0.021*** -0.021***     
 (-3.30)  (-4.17)  (-2.57)  (-3.63)  (-3.36)  (-3.44)  (-2.87) (-2.88)  (-3.27) (-3.32)     
SOCIOECON. CONDITIONS    2.054***    2.481***  0.122*** 0.091**  0.075*** 0.080***  0.094*** 0.107***  2.089*** 2.098*** 
    (6.09)   (8.35)  (3.14) (2.31)  (4.46) (-4.59)  (4.15) (-4.58)  (6.15) (6.05) 
LATITUDE                   11.356***  8.412** 
                  (3.00)  (2.14) 
LINGUISTIC  FRACTION.                  -4.000* 
                   (-1.77) 
SHARE  OF  PROTESTANTS                   0.068** 
                   (2.41) 
Test of excluded  instruments  10.86***  24.93*** 15.07*** 39.24***  9.59***  7.99***  13.28*** 13.88***  13.13*** 15.07***  21.19*** 13.01*** 
Regional  Fixed  Effects  YES YES YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects  NO NO YES  YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO NO 
Anderson canon. corr. LR 
statistic  
11.095*** 47.054*** 6.760***  69.720***  19.321*** 16.130***  26.223*** 27.120***  25.961*** 29.240***  40.612*** 49.305*** 
Anderson Rubin test  5.15***  7.12***  8.25***  6.71*** 7.12***  6.71*** 6.03***  4.78***  6.03*** 4.78***  5.43*** 3.00** 
Sargan statistic     0.200     4.096**  0.144 0.017  0.690 0.567 0.002  0.295 0.463  2.016 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Observations  219 219 219 219  219 219  150 150  150 150  219 218 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Control variables in line with specifications (20).  
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Table 6: 2SLS Estimations Including Tax Morale 
POOLED FE FE  FE FE  FE FE  FE FE POOLED POOLED POOLED POOLED   Dependent Variable: Shadow Economy 
 (75)    (76)    (77)    (78)    (79)    (80)    (81)    (82)    (83)    (84)    (85)    (86)   (87) 
A) GOVERN./INSTIT. QUALITY                       
ICRG                      
POLITICAL RISK  RATING  -0.887*** -0.686**        -0.822***      -0.729*** -0.773***-0.623*** -0.571*** 
  (-2.94)  (-2.58)      (-3.32)      (-3.33)  (-3.01)  (-2.95)  (-3.03) 
CORRUPTION     -8.476**      -8.413***          
     (-2.28)      (-3.26)           
AGGR. GOVERNANCE INDIC.                    
INDEX  GOVERNANCE       -12.496***     -14.834***      
      (-3.01)      (-3.25)         
CONTR. OF CORRUPTION          -8.805**        -9.808***      
        (-2.62)       (-3.10)      
B) WILLINGNESS TO PAY                    
Tax Morale  -20.410** -29.897***-29.003**-20.496**  -22.820**-11.139*** -9.699**  -14.762***-13.312***-10.489** -15.959* -13.842* -10.273** 
  (-2.26) (-3.00)  (-2.57) (-2.28)  (-2.19) (-2.54)  (-2.16)  (-3.36) (-2.97) (-2.53)  (-1.87)  (-1.79)  (-2.53) 
C) CONTROL VARIABLES   INCL.  INCL. INCL.  INCL. INCL.  INCL. INCL.  INCL. INCL. INCL. INCL. INCL. INCL. 
FIRST  STAGE  REGRESSIONS                  
INSTR.  INST./GOV. Q.               
TEMPERATURE -0.199**  -0.197**  -0.030**  -0.020*** -0.026***-0.250*** -0.030** -0.017*** -0.024***     
 (-2.15)  (-2.19)  (-2.19)  (-3.29)  (-3.40)  (-2.61) (-2.00)  (-2.75) (-2.94)     
SOCIOECON. COND.  2.006***  2.134*** 0.141** 0.107*** 0.159*** 1.985*** 0.184***  0.094*** 0.142*** 2.193***  2.224*** 2.390***  2.312*** 
  (5.61) (6.04)  (2.63) (4.85)  (5.73) (5.46)  (3.21)  (4.24) (5.00) (6.24)  (6.46)  (6.91)  (6.63) 
LATITUDE               13.460***11.627** 8.497*  9.916** 
               (2.85)  (2.62)  (1.85)  (2.04) 
LINGUISTIC  FRACTION.                   -6.543*** -7.032*** 
                   (-2.70) (-2.95) 
SHARE  OF  PROTESTANTS                   0.034 0.043 
                   (1.31) 1.59 
Test of excluded  instruments  11.73*** 
 
13.59*** 3.92**  9.90***  12.87*** 11.46*** 4.46*** 7.96*** 10.34***  14.59***  15.43*** 11.48***  11.64*** 
INSTR. TAX MORALE                
Cloudiness -0.010*** -0.009***  -0.009***-0.008** -0.008**           -0.010***-0.010***  
  (-3.55) (-3.14)  (-3.14) (-2.44)  (-2.44)          (-3.27)  (-3.24)   
Index moral values           0.016*** 0.016***  0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016***    0.016*** 
         (7.40) (7.40)  (6.20) (6.20) (7.45)    (7.24) 
Test of excluded  instruments  4.88***  3.58**  3.58** 2.35*  2.35*  19.72***  19.72***  14.07*** 14.07*** 19.63***  4.52*** 2.68*** 11.24*** 
Regional  Fixed  Effects  YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES  YES 
Time Fixed Effects  NO  YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES  YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic   12.487***10.328*** 8.890*** 7.839*** 7.473*** 32.225***  14.142***18.808*** 22.616*** 35.81*** 10.86*** 12.641***45.405*** 
Anderson Rubin test  5.57***  7.12***  7.12***  4.06**  4.06** 6.67*** 6.67***  4.60*** 4.60*** 5.63***  4.39***  2.53** 3.31** 
Sargan statistic  0.321  0.396  0.133  0.000  0.026  0.229 0.015  0.118 0.023 0.700 1.368 2.863 3.321 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Observations  102  102  102  74 74  95 95  69 69 94  101  100  93 
Notes: t -statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Control variables in line with specifications (24).  
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Table 7: Evidence from Switzerland 
Dependent variable: shadow 
economy  
FE 
(88) 
FE 
(89) 
FE 
(90) 
FE 
(91) 
FE 
(92) 
2SLS 
(FE) 
(93) 
First stage 
regr. 
FE 
(94) 
OLS
a 
(95) 
2SLS 
(FE) 
(96) 
First 
stage 
regr. 
Independent variables                     
a) WILL.  TO PAY TAXES                     
TAX  MORALE  -0.013* -0.011*                
   (-1.92)  (-1.79)               
b) INSTITITUTION                  
DEMOCRATIC  PARTIC.  -0.019* -0.018* -0.017** -0.021*** -0.015**  -0.060***   -0.011** -0.305** -0.056**   
RIGHTS  (-1.89) (-1.85) (-2.36)  (-2.80)  (-2.56)  (-2.87)    (-2.00) (-2.18) (-2.32)   
       INSTRUMENTS                      
  Share of Protestants            5.873***      5.276*** 
            (2.97)      (2.43) 
  Test of excluded  instr.              8.85***         
c) GOVERMENT                    
  -0.001 -0.001**  -0.001** -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001  -0.001** -0.161  -0.001*** -0.3E-03   TAX BURDEN 
  (-1.63)  (-2.21)  (-2.25) (-4.39) (-2.66) (-0.16)  (-4.76)  (-1.34)  (-2.81) (-0.07) 
           0.0002** 0.267**  0.4E-04  -0.001  PROBABILITY OF 
DETECTION              (2.60) (2.33) (0.36)  (-0.68) 
d) CONTROL VARIABLES                     
      -0.159*  -0.233***  -0.328***  -6.437*** -0.151**  -0.106  -0.303** -6.502***  LABOR FORCE 
      (-1.78)  (-3.34)  (-3.03)  (-3.00)  (-2.07)  (-0.84)  (-2.31)  (-3.01) 
      0.130  0.160*  0.218*  0.897  0.155*  0.430**  0.213*  0.940  URBANIZATION 
      1.19  (1.91)  (1.76)  (0.46)  (1.95)  (2.07)  (1.79)  (0.48) 
SHARE OF REGISTERED           0.688***  0.528***  6.022  0.634**  0.398*  0.525***  5.505 
HOUSE PROPRIETORS           (5.90)  (2.91) (1.45)  (5.66)  (1.81)  (3.05) (1.29) 
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic              8.968***       6.270***   
Anderson Rubin test             21.93***       13.54***   
State  (canton)  effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  No Yes Yes 
Observations  46 46 78  78  78  78  78  78  78  78  78 
R-squared  0.274 0.372 0.175  0.241  0.564     0.620 0.146   
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
a beta coefficients.   
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics and a Summary of the Results (International Investigation) 
VARIABLES Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min Max Source  Results 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE                   
SHADOW ECONOMY  29.594  13.193  6.90  67.30  Schneider (2005a, b)    
GOVERNANCE/INSTITUTIONAL Q.          
ICRG          
COMPOSITE RISK RATING  66.276  12.987  24.83  92.50  ICRG  - 
POLITICAL RISK RATING  65.088  13.785  11.33  95.25  ICRG  - 
BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY  2.319  1.167 0.00  4.00  ICRG  - 
CORRUPTION 3.473  1.273  0.08  6.00  ICRG  - 
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNT.  3.932  1.471  0.00  6.00  ICRG  (-) 
GOVERNMENT STABILITY  7.388 2.288  1.00  12.00 ICRG  (-) 
LAW AND ORDER  3.938  1.501  0.00  6.00  ICRG  - 
INTERNAL  CONFLICT  9.092 2.629  0.00  12.00 ICRG  - 
MILITARY INTERFERENCE  4.014  1.694  0.00  6.00  ICRG  - 
          
AGGR.  GOVERNANCE  INDICATORS          
INDEX GOVERNANCE   0.193  0.866  -1.27  1.95  Kaufmann et al. (2003)  - 
CONTROL OF CORRUP.  0.156  1.040  -1.98  2.56  Kaufmann et al. (2003)  - 
POLITICAL STABILITY  0.149  0.866  -2.78  1.73  Kaufmann et al. (2003)  - 
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIV.  0.222  0.971  -1.22  2.51  Kaufmann et al. (2003)  - 
VOICE AND ACCOUNT.  0.161  0.891  -1.64  1.76  Kaufmann et al. (2003)  (-) 
RULE OF LAW  0.194  0.989  -1.25  2.20  Kaufmann et al. (2003)  - 
REGULATORY QUALITY  0.287  0.868  -2.70  2.31  Kaufmann et al. (2003)  (-) 
          
ECONOMIC FREEDOM          
LEGAL SYSTEM   5.888  1.849  2.20  9.60  The Fraser Institute  - 
LAW AND ORDER  6.862  2.448  0.00  10.00  The Fraser Institute  - 
JUD. INDEPENDENCE   6.491  2.187  1.50  9.80  The Fraser Institute  - 
IMPARTIAL COURTS   5.930  1.795  2.50  9.70  The Fraser Institute  - 
PROPERTY RIGHTS   5.336  2.021  1.20  9.40  The Fraser Institute  - 
MILITARY INTERFERENCE  6.985  2.355  0.00  10.00  The Fraser Institute  - 
ADMINISTR. CONDITIONS  7.099  0.716  5.10  8.50  The Fraser Institute  - 
BUREAUCRACY (TIME)  6.618  1.488  2.20  9.70  The Fraser Institute  (-) 
STARTING BUSINESS  5.770  1.567  2.50  9.10  The Fraser Institute  (-) 
IRREGULAR PAYMENTS  6.071  2.280  0.60  10.00  The Fraser Institute  - 
BUSINESS REGULATIONS  6.214  1.478  2.60  9.40  The Fraser Institute  - 
          
WILLIGNESS TO PAY TAXES       World  Values  Survey   
TAX MORALE  2.085  0.396  1.11  2.96    - 
          
CONTROL VARIABLES          
LOG (GDP PER CAPITA)  7.654  1.586  4.71  10.53  World Development Indicators  (-) 
AGRICULTURE (% of GDP)  16.640  13.442  0.07  57.65  World Development Indicators  (+) 
URBANIZATION  55.715 22.131  8.90  100.00 World Development Indicators  (+) 
LOG (POPULATION)  16.550  1.306  14.17  20.95  World Development Indicators  (-) 
LOG (LABOR FORCE)  15.705  1.315  13.15  20.42  World Development Indicators  (+) 
TRADE (% GDP)  71.811  39.133  14.41  290.85  World Development Indicators  ((-)) 
TOP MARGINAL TAX RATE  4.794  2.727  0.00  10.00  The Fraser Institute  (+) 
PRICE CONTROLS  4.592  2.853  0.00  10.00  The Fraser Institute   ((-)) 
LABOR MARKET REGULATIONS  5.145  1.375  1.80  8.90  The Fraser Institute  ((+)) 
INSTRUMENTS          
ANNUAL TEMPERATURE  16.789  8.194  -5.50  29.00  Mitchell et al. (2003)   
CLOUDINESS (%)  54.621  14.302  18.90  77.50  Mitchell et al. (2003)   
SOCIO ECONOMIC CONDITIONS  5.693  1.943  1.00  11.00  ICRG   
INDEX MORAL VALUES  62.535 13.166  28.100 94.250 World Values Survey   
LATITUDE  0.343 0.195  0.011 0.711 La Porta et al. (1999)   
LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION  0.372 0.288  0.002 0.923 Alesina et al. (2003)   
SHARE OF PROTESTANTS  10.543 19.700  0.000  97.800 La Porta et al. (1999)   
Notes: Tendencies: - Reduction of the shadow economy, always statistically significant.. (+) and (-)  mostly or 
sometimes statistically significant ((+)), ((-)), (almost) never  statistically significant.   
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics and a Summary of the Results (Within Country Investigation) 
 
VARIABLES Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min Max Source  Results 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE             
SHADOW ECONOMY  0.073 0.013  0.05  0.10  Own calculations    
            
INSTITUTIONS            
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION   4.256 1.200  1.58  5.83  Own calculation based    
RIGHTS          on Stutzer (1999)  - 
            
WILLIGNESS TO PAY TAXES           
TAX MORALE  1.894 0.353  1.03  3.00  WVS, ISSP  - 
           
CONTROL VARIABLES           
TAX BURDEN  103.328  17.522  56.90  143.00  Swiss Federal Statistical Office  (-) 
PROBABILITY OF DETECTION  63.188 41.433  3.14  188.98  Frey and Feld (2002)  (+) 
LABOR FORCE  0.502  0.027  0.44  0.56  Swiss Federal Statistical Office  - 
URBANIZATION  0.324  0.250  0.00  0.99  Swiss Federal Statistical Office  (+) 
SHARE OF REGISTERED  0.412  0.111  0.13  0.61  Swiss Federal Statistical Office  + 
HOUSE PROPRIETORS           
            
INSTRUMENT (RELIGION)            
SHARE OF PROTESTANTS  0.297  0.188  0.06  0.75  Swiss Federal Statistical Office   
Notes: Tendencies: - Reduction of the shadow economy, always statistically significant.. (+) and (-)  mostly or sometimes 
statistically significant. 
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Table A3: Overview of the Countries 
1990 1995 2000 
countries countries  countries countries  countries countries 
Albania Madagascar  Albania Malawi  Albania Lebanon 
Algeria Malawi  Algeria Malaysia Algeria Lithuania 
Argentina Malaysia  Argentina Mali  Argentina Madagascar 
Australia Mali  Australia Mexico Armenia  Malawi 
Austria Mexico  Austria Mongolia Australia  Malaysia 
Bangladesh Mongolia  Bangladesh Morocco  Austria  Mali 
Belgium Morocco  Belgium Mozambique  Azerbaijan  Mexico 
Bolivia Mozambique  Bolivia Netherlands  Bangladesh  Moldova 
Botswana Netherlands  Botswana New  Zealand  Belarus  Mongolia 
Brazil New  Zealand  Brazil Nicaragua  Belgium  Morocco 
Bulgaria Nicaragua Burkina  Faso  Niger  Bolivia  Mozambique 
Burkina Faso  Niger  Cameroon  Nigeria Botswana  Netherlands 
Cameroon Nigeria  Canada  Norway Brazil  New  Zealand 
Canada Norway  Chile  Pakistan Bulgaria  Nicaragua 
Chile Pakistan  China  Panama  Burkina  Faso  Niger 
China Panama  Colombia  Peru Cameroon  Nigeria 
Colombia Peru  Costa  Rica  Philippines Canada  Norway 
Costa Rica  Philippines  Cote d'Ivoire Poland  Chile  Pakistan 
Cote d'Ivoire  Poland  Czech Republic  Portugal  China  Panama 
Denmark Portugal  Denmark Romania  Colombia  Peru 
Dominican Republic  Romania  Dominican Republic  Russian Federation  Costa Rica  Philippines 
Ecuador Saudi  Arabia  Ecuador Saudi Arabia  Cote d'Ivoire  Poland 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Senegal  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Senegal  Croatia  Portugal 
Ethiopia  South Africa  Ethiopia  Slovak Republic  Czech Republic  Romania 
Finland Spain  Finland South  Africa Denmark  Russian  Federation 
France  Sri Lanka  France  Spain  Dominican Republic  Saudi Arabia 
Germany Sweden  Germany Sri  Lanka  Ecuador  Senegal 
Ghana  Switzerland  Ghana  Sweden  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Slovak Republic 
Greece  Syrian Arab Republic  Greece  Switzerland  Ethiopia  Slovenia 
Guatemala  Tanzania  Guatemala  Syrian Arab Republic  Finland  South Africa 
Honduras Thailand  Honduras Tanzania  France  Spain 
Hong Kong, China  Tunisia  Hong Kong, China  Thailand  Germany  Sri Lanka 
Hungary Turkey  Hungary Tunisia  Ghana  Sweden 
India Uganda  India Turkey  Greece  Switzerland 
Indonesia  United Arab Emirates  Indonesia  Uganda  Guatemala  Syrian Arab Republic 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  United Kingdom  Iran, Islamic Rep.  United Arab Emirates  Honduras Tanzania 
Ireland United  States  Ireland United  Kingdom  Hong Kong, China  Thailand 
Italy Uruguay  Italy United  States Hungary  Tunisia 
Jamaica Venezuela,  RB  Jamaica Uruguay  India  Turkey 
Japan Vietnam  Japan Venezuela, RB  Indonesia  Uganda 
Jordan Yemen,  Rep.  Jordan Vietnam  Iran, Islamic Rep.  Ukraine 
Kenya  Zambia  Korea, Rep.  Yemen, Rep.  Ireland  United Arab Emirates 
Korea, Rep.  Zimbabwe  Lebanon Zambia  Italy  United  Kingdom 
   Madagascar  Zimbabwe  Jamaica  United  States 
      Japan  Uruguay 
      Jordan  Venezuela,  RB 
      Kazakhstan  Vietnam 
      Kenya  Yemen,  Rep. 
      Korea,  Rep.  Zambia 
      Latvia  Zimbabwe 
TOTAL  86   88   100 
Note:  Countries in Table 1(highest number of observations).   
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